Purpose. To investigate the predictive value of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and features of ASPD (i.e., lack of remorse, blame externalization, and deceitfulness) for symptom exaggeration.
concerns seem more appropriate in some cases than in others, depending on the personality of the examinee and the psycho-legal issue that is assessed. Because 'deceit and manipulation are central features of antisocial personality disorder' (ASPD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 659) , it stands to reason that those with antisocial personality traits tend to misrepresent psycho-legally relevant information. Consistent with the notion that antisocial personalities are prone to deceitfulness, and that symptom exaggeration is a form of deceit, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) adheres to the idea that symptom exaggeration (e.g., malingering) is an act typically committed by individuals with ASPD. Thus, the DSM-5 states that individuals with ASPD 'may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger' (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 660, italics added) . This typology of symptom exaggeration -dubbed 'the criminological model' by Rogers, Sewell, and Goldstein (1994) -has remained unchanged through four revisions since its first appearance in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) .
Nearly three decades ago, Rogers (1990a) found the empirical evidence to justify the use of ASPD as an indicator of symptom exaggeration to be meagre. Since then, Rogers' continued criticism (e.g., Rogers, 2008; Rogers & Shuman, 2005) has been corroborated by multiple empirical studies (e.g., Pierson, Rosenfeld, Green, & Belfi, 2011; Sumanti, Boone, Savodnik, & Gorsuch, 2006) . While some studies did find ASPD to be associated with symptom exaggeration (e.g., Delain, Stafford, & Ben-Porath, 2003; Gacono, Meloy, Sheppard, Speth, & Roske, 1995) , the magnitude of the associations is insufficient to be of any diagnostic value (van Impelen et al., 2017) .
In two previous studies, we investigated the predictive value of antisocial behaviour for symptom exaggeration in a medium security forensic psychiatric hospital in the Netherlands where patients are admitted post-trial and found it to be non-existent (van Impelen et al., 2017) . This squares with the review by Niesten, Nentjes, Merckelbach, and Bernstein (2015) , who concluded that a general predisposition to disregard and violate rules and social norms has little predictive value for symptom exaggeration. It may well be, however, that other features of ASPD drive the modest associations that some studies find between symptom exaggeration and ASPD (e.g., Delain et al., 2003) , but also between symptom exaggeration and psychopathy (e.g., Gacono et al., 1995; Heinze & Vess, 2005; .
Arguably, the feature of ASPD that is most likely to be associated with symptom exaggeration is deceitfulness. Indeed, the assumption that individuals who are deceitful in one domain (e.g., offense reporting) are more prone to be deceitful in other domains (e.g., symptom reporting) has ample intuitive allure. In contrast to earlier research, we explicitly tested this assumption in this study by comparing the accuracy of patients' self-reported symptoms with the accuracy of their self-reported offense descriptions, and by quantifying the degree to which patients denied or minimized their delinquency.
Another feature of ASPD that may seem to predispose to symptom misrepresentation is lack of remorse and the tendency to rationalize transgressions. We addressed this hypothesis by assessing the extent to which patients felt remorse for their offenses and blamed their offenses on external factors (such as social environments, victims, or society) and on mental disorders or insufficient self-control. Thus, in addition to testing the strength of ASPD as indicator of symptom exaggeration directly, we investigated underlying features that potentially link ASPD to symptom exaggeration.
Method
This study followed a correlational design in which self-report measures were administered to forensic psychiatric patients (see below). Symptom exaggeration, lack of remorse, and blame externalization were measured with validated instruments (the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology, SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997 ; and the Revised Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory, BAI; Gudjonsson & Singh, 1989) . To address deceitfulness, we devised several proxies; offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, denial of aggression, and offense minimization. Offense report inaccuracy was quantified by contrasting the information that participants reported during a semistructured interview with the information in the official records of their offenses. Denial of offense was determined by gathering patients' therapists' and treatment supervisors' judgement on this matter from patient records. Offense minimization and denial of aggression were measured through a brief questionnaire that we developed for that purpose. To assess the relation between symptom exaggeration, on the one hand, and potential predictors of symptom exaggeration (i.e., offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, denial of aggression, lack of remorse, and blame externalization), on the other hand, we conducted a correlational analysis and we cross-tabulated prevalence rates of symptom exaggeration with prevalence rates of the potential predictors. Based on the results of our previous studies (van Impelen et al., 2017) and the review by Niesten et al. (2015) , we did not expect symptom exaggeration to be related to biased offense reporting (i.e., offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, and denial of aggression), lack of remorse, or external blame attribution.
Participants
Participants were recruited from three outpatient units and one inpatient unit of Radix Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, located in the Netherlands. All participants had a history of delinquent behaviour and were in treatment for psychiatric symptoms; 65% was being treated on a mandatory basis (i.e., compulsory treatment imposed by the Dutch probation services) and 35% had voluntarily applied for treatment to avoid escalation of criminal behaviour and contact with the justice system. Crimes that patients were convicted for included arson, assault, battery, burglary, drug-related offenses, robbery, and sexual assault. The therapies and interventions that patients were enrolled in aimed to improve mental health and reduce recidivism risk. Patients who were suffering from acute drug withdrawal or psychosis were not eligible for participation. Fifty-seven patients completed the study: 53 men (M age = 36.5, SD = 10.1, range: 22-57) and 4 women (M age = 40.3, SD = 9.2, range: 30-49). Most patients (67%; n = 38) identified themselves as being of Dutch descent, 18% (n = 10) originated from a state within the European Union, and 16% (n = 9) hailed from a state outside the European Union.
All participants who receive treatment at Radix underwent a comprehensive psychological evaluation, which includes, for example, cognitive tests, personality assessment, clinical interviews, behavioural observations, and background checks. The results of the psychological evaluations are weighed and integrated according to the criteria set forth in the DSM-5 and culminate in concomitant diagnoses. We retrieved the diagnoses of participants from their patient records at Radix. The majority of patients were diagnosed with a substance-related disorder (68%; n = 39) and roughly half of the patients with a personality disorder (53%; n = 30). Other mental disorders included depression (12%; n = 7), intellectual disability (9%; n = 5), anxiety disorder (7%; n = 4), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (7%; n = 4). The prevalence of ASPD was 18% (n = 10). Thus, the ASPD subsample consisted of 10 patients and the non-ASPD subsample consisted of 47 patients.
Measures

Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology
The SIMS (Smith & Burger, 1997 ; for the Dutch translation, see Merckelbach & Smith, 2003 ) is a self-report screen for exaggerated symptomatology. It comprises 75 true-false statements, which are evenly distributed over five subscales that target exaggerated depression, psychosis, neurologic impairment, memory dysfunction, and low intelligence, respectively. The statements refer to extreme and atypical symptoms, such as 'I have difficulty recognizing written and spoken words' and 'When I can't remember something, hints do not help'. The number of endorsed statements is used as an indicator of symptom exaggeration, with a cut score of >16 being associated with a sensitivity of about .91 and a specificity of around .65 (van Impelen, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Merten, 2014) . The internal consistency of the SIMS is adequate (Cronbach's alpha coefficient = .88, Widows & Smith, 2005) .
Offense report inaccuracy
To assess the inaccuracy with which patients described their most recent offense, we developed a semi-structured interview and a coding scheme to compare the self-report version of the offense with the official file version of the offense (see Porter & Woodworth, 2007 , for a similar approach). The interview served to gather information that was important to understanding how the offense happened. Such information was coded as distinct pieces of 'main information'. Examples of main information are the type and severity of the offense, the nature of the weapon or violence that was used, the relationship with the victim, characteristics of the victim and the location, involvement of drugs, and the motive for the offense. After coding the information that was gathered from the interview into pieces of main information, all pieces of main information were checked against the official documents about the offense (i.e., documents of the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology). For each piece of main information, it was determined whether or not the patient omitted or altered the information during the interview (0: main information accurately reported; 1: main information inaccurately reported). The data of sixteen patients were excluded because the official documentation of their offense did not suffice to verify at least five pieces of main information. The mean number of pieces of main information of the remainder of the sample (n = 41) was 8.0 (SD = 2.3, range: 5-13). To account for differences in the number of pieces of main information that could be verified, offense report inaccuracy was calculated as the proportion of verifiable pieces of main information that was inaccurately reported.
Denial of offense
An essential component of treatment at Radix Forensic Psychiatric Hospital revolves around patients' ability to recognize and constrain their delinquent behaviour and accept responsibility for past delinquency. The extent to which patients acknowledge the offenses they committed is judged by therapists and treatment supervisors and recorded in patient records. We collected this information from participants' patient records and coded it as 0 (no offense denial), 1 (partial offense denial and/or minimization), or 2 (complete offense denial).
Offense minimization
We measured patients' minimization of their most recent offense with six items based on those constructed by Henning and Holdford (2006) . Minimization was quantified by having patients indicate on a 5-point scale (ranging from 0; none of it was true, to 4; all of it was true) 'How much of what the police said about this incident was true.' and by five statements that were to be responded to via a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree), such as 'This situation got blown way out of proportion', and 'The police made this incident sound much worse than it was'. After reversing the score on the first item, the scores on the items were summed to obtain a total score that ranges from 0 to 19, with higher scores indicating greater offense minimization. The reliability of the offense minimization scale, as quantified by Cronbach's alpha, was .52, which is questionable and suggests that the items vary in the type of minimization they tap (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011) .
Denial of aggression
Denial of aggression during their most recent offense was probed by asking patients whether they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: 'There was no argument between me and the victim.' and 'There was no physical violence between me and the victim.' For each patient, the actual occurrence of verbal aggression or physical violence during their most recent offense was verified through the official file information about their offense, as documented in reports drawn up by the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, which is part of the Dutch Ministry of Justice. The data of seventeen patients were excluded because their most recent offense did not involve an argument or physical violence. Responses were summed, such that the overall index varied between 0 (no denial) and 2 (complete denial).
Revised Gudjonsson Blame Attribution Inventory
The BAI (Gudjonsson & Singh, 1989 ) is a self-report measure of blame attribution for criminal transgressions. It consists of 42 first-person statements that are responded to via 5-point scales (0 = 'I do not at all agree'; 4 = 'I fully agree'). The BAI probes three separate dimensions of blame attribution for offenses: Guilt-feeling attribution (i.e., feeling remorse or regret for offenses; 18 items, score range 0-72, Cronbach's alpha = .81); External attribution (i.e., blaming offenses on social environments, victims, or society; 15 items, score range 0-60, Cronbach's alpha = .77); and Mentalelement attribution (i.e., placing blame on mental disorders or insufficient self-control; 9 items, score range 0-36, Cronbach's alpha = .79). Typical items are 'I feel very ashamed of the crime(s) I committed.' (Guilt-feeling attribution), 'I did not deserve to be caught for the crime I committed.' (External attribution), and 'I would certainly not have committed the crime I did if I had been mentally well.' (Mental-element attribution).
Procedure
Prior to data collection, approval was obtained from Radix Forensic Psychiatric Hospital in Heerlen, the Netherlands, and from the standing ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience of Maastricht University. Data were collected solely for research purposes and were not relayed to staff or treatment personnel. Tests were administered by two graduate psychology students who were acquainted with test protocols.
At the inpatient location, recruitment was initiated via brief announcements during morning gatherings. Interested patients were asked if they agreed to be approached by one of the researchers, from whom they could receive additional information on an individual basis. A similar procedure was followed at the outpatient locations, except that the initial brief announcements were made by therapists to their patients individually. Before being asked for their written informed consent, patients received both verbal and written information about the study.
Because knowledge of the research design could influence patients' responses to the self-report measures, we veiled the purpose of the study by telling patients that the study was about the relation between personality characteristics and symptomatology, but leaving out that we were specifically interested in exaggerated symptomatology and antisocial personality characteristics. To safeguard the design of the study, the debriefing of patients took place after all data had been collected.
We stimulated patients' openness and honesty by imploring them to be completely truthful in answering all questions and by stressing the importance of the research and the potential profits that it might yield in general (i.e., more accurate diagnostic procedures and thereby better allocation of treatment resources). Participation in the study was completely voluntary; no rewards or incentives were offered for participation. To protect the privacy of the patients, test sessions took place in secluded rooms and none of the study materials, except the informed consent, were signed with information other than participant numbers.
Test sessions lasted approximately 45 min. Patients were at liberty to take a break at any time. After giving written informed consent, patients completed, in fixed order, the SIMS, the semi-structured interview about their offense, the denial and minimization questionnaire, and the BAI.
Results
The difference in settings -three outpatient unit and one inpatient unit -did not affect scores on any of the measures; F(24, 63) = 0.88, p = .63, which permits pooling of the data. Table 1 summarizes sample sizes and mean scores on the various measures. The mean SIMS score (9.8, 95% CI [8.2, 11.5]) is typical for clinical populations (van Impelen et al., 2014) . Patients with ASPD produced a mean SIMS score that was nearly equivalent to that of the other patients, 10.0 vs. 9.8; t(55) = À0.9, p = .93. SIMS scores above the recommended cut-off that signals symptom exaggeration were equally prevalent among patients with ASPD and other patients (cut score >16; 10% vs. 13%). Several patients (n = 5) were diagnosed with intellectual disability -a disorder that may cause falsepositive validity test results (Victor & Boone, 2007 ) -but none of these patients scored beyond the cut-off on the SIMS.
The mean proportion of inaccurately reported pieces of main information that patients reported about their most recent offense was .17 (95% CI [.11, .23] ). Proportions inaccurately reported offense information between .10 and .25 occurred in eleven patients (27%), proportions between .25 and .50 occurred in seven patients (17%), and proportions above .50 in five patients (12%). The mean denial of offense score -based on clinician's judgement as recorded in patient records -was 0.7 (range: 0-2, 95% CI [0.6, 0.9]). The denial of aggression score averaged 0.9 (range: 0-2, 95% CI [0.6, 1.1]), with five patients (12%) falsely denying the occurrence of an argument during their most recent offense; seven patients (17%) falsely denying physical violence; and 12 patients (29%) falsely denying both an argument and violence. Offense minimization scores -based on self-report -ranged from 1 to 18 (of the possible 0-19), with the mean score being 9.2 (95% CI [8.3, 10 .1]). Six patients (12%) scored higher than 13, which is 68% of the maximum score, and signals serious minimization.
The mean score on the BAI guilt-feeling attribution scale was 34.7 (95% CI [31.8, 37.6]), which indicates that, on average, patients expressed only modest remorse or regret for their offenses. The mean BAI external attribution scale score was 21.4 (95% CI [19.1, 23.8]), signifying that patient's blame attribution styles were moderately externalizing, with substantial proportions of blame for offenses being ascribed to social environmental factors, victims, or society. The mean BAI mental-element attribution scale score was 19.4 (95% CI [17.4, 21 .3]), suggesting that patients were typically inclined to blame their offenses at least in part on psychological symptoms or insufficient self-control.
To examine the relationship between symptom exaggeration, ASPD, and bias in offense-related self-report, we computed Pearson product-moment correlations (except where noted) between SIMS scores, ASPD diagnoses (point-biserial correlations), and the indices of offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, denial of aggression, and criminal blame attribution (BAI). Table 2 displays the results; symptom exaggeration was moderately associated with the attribution of criminal blame to external factors (such as social economic environment, victims, or society; r = .31 [.05, Antisocial features and symptom exaggeration 141 *p < .05, two-tailed; **p < .01, two-tailed.
.53] p < .05, two-tailed), but neither related to ASPD, nor to any index of bias in offenserelated self-report, feelings of guilt or regret, or attribution of criminal blame to psychopathology. Antisocial personality disorder was inversely related to the attribution of criminal blame to psychopathology (r pb = À.37 [À.58, À.12] p < .01, two-tailed); compared with other patients, patients with ASPD tended to ascribe less criminal blame to psychopathological symptoms. The attribution of criminal blame to psychopathology also correlated negatively with denial of aggression (r = À.32 [À.54, À.07] p < .05, twotailed); patients who more strenuously falsely denied having had an argument or a physical fight with the victim of their offense, generally attributed less criminal blame to psychopathology. The diagnostic value of an indicator (e.g., ASPD) for a target condition (e.g., symptom exaggeration) depends on the prevalence of the indicator among those with the condition as well as the prevalence of the condition among those with the indicator. Table 3 presents such data for several potential indicators of symptom exaggeration, including offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, denial of aggression, lack of guilt (i.e., remorse), externalization of criminal blame, attribution of blame to psychopathology, and ASPD. We employed two thresholds for considering whether or not an indicator was present in a patient: The first thresholds were scores at or beyond the 80th percentile of the score distribution of an indicator (or ≤20th percentile if the indicator was hypothesized to correlate negatively with symptom exaggeration) and the second thresholds were scores ≥90th/≤10th score percentiles. As can be seen in Table 3 , all of the potential indicators of symptom exaggeration produce unacceptable error rates: False-positive predictions range from 60% to 100% and falsenegative predictions range from 50% to 100%. Fisher's exact tests computed for these data confirmed that symptom exaggeration was not associated with any of the potential indicators (all ps > .09).
Discussion
Because deceitfulness is a core feature of ASPD, it may be attractive to consider ASPD a useful indicator of symptom exaggeration. The current findings do not support this notion: ASPD had no predictive value for symptom exaggeration. The predictive values of three features of ASPD that may link it with symptom exaggeration, namely deceitfulness (i.e., offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, and denial of aggression), lack of remorse, and blame externalization, were trivial as well. Thus, the present data dispute the inclusion of ASPD among conditions that signal symptom exaggeration, and cast doubt on the assumptions that underlie the hypothesized relation between ASPD and malingering.
As can be seen in Table 3 , each of the potential indicators of symptom exaggeration is ineffective when used in isolation. To test whether the predictive value of the indicators increases when they are used jointly, we employed them in concert through a discriminant function analysis. This yielded a detection rate of symptom exaggeration of 29%, which corresponds to a 71% false-negative rate. The average detection rate of the indicators individually is 29% at the ≥80th/≤20th percentile threshold and 16% at the ≥90th/≤10th percentile threshold (corresponding to 71% and 84% false-negative rates, respectively). Thus, there is little gain in detection rate when using the indicators in a joint analysis. This underscores the inefficacy of these variables (i.e., ASPD, offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, denial of aggression, lack of remorse, externalization of criminal blame, and attribution of blame to psychopathology) as potential indicators of symptom exaggeration.
The only potential indicator that we found to be statistically significantly associated with symptom exaggeration is the attribution of criminal blame to external factors (such as social economic environment, victims, or society; r = .31 [.05, .53] ). This result mirrors that of an earlier study (van Impelen et al., 2017) , where we found a modest relation between blame externalization and symptom exaggeration among internees of a youth prison (N = 45, r = .35, [.06, .59] ). Nevertheless, the strength of this association does not suffice to produce a satisfactory predictive value (43-29% detection rate, 75-60% falsepositive rate; see Table 3 ).
The most prominent limitation of the present study is arguably the small sample size: Of the 57 patients, 10 were diagnosed with ASPD, and seven produced SIMS scores suggestive of symptom exaggeration; only one of whom was diagnosed with ASPD. However, testifying to the reliability of these findings is that they echo the results that we reported earlier based on similar data we gathered at the same forensic psychiatric hospital (van Impelen et al., 2017) . In that study (N = 57), there was no overlap between patients with ASPD (n = 9) and patients who engaged in symptom exaggeration (n = 5). In our previous paper, we also pointed out that associations or effects need to be fairly large in order to be diagnostically relevant (i.e., Cohen's ds ≥ 1.2). Small sample sizes (down to 54) are sufficient to detect such large effects, even if the prevalence of symptom exaggeration is low (e.g., 10%). For example, in the present study, the achieved power in the comparison of SIMS scores between patients with ASPD (n = 10) and other patients (n = 47) is .96 (a = .05, one-tailed); in the same comparison between patients who denied aggression (n = 12) and other patients (n = 29), the attained power is also .96 (a = .05, one-tailed). Thus, the sample size of the present study, while small, suffices to detect any associations or effects that would be diagnostically useful.
Another limitation is that the causes of offense report inaccuracy cannot be determined. It could be that a portion of the offense report inaccuracies are genuine errors of memory (e.g., confabulations) rather than the intentional, goal-directed distortions (e.g., lies) that are hypothesized to be associated with ASPD. To differentiate deception from memory errors, future studies could employ deception detection techniques such as the Comparison Question Test and the Concealed Information Test (for more information, see, e.g., Meijer, Verschuere, Gamer, Merckelbach, & Ben-Shakhar, 2016) .
The results of the present study fit into the cadre of empirical research that dispels the notion of malingering or symptom exaggeration as a disposition that is related to antisocial traits. The 'criminological model' of symptom exaggeration, as perpetuated in the DSM-5, does not hold against the mounting data that malingering, feigning, or exaggerating symptomatology is not driven by personality characteristics, antisocial or otherwise. For example, Young, Jacobson, Einzig, Gray, and Gudjonsson (2016) assessed 63 claimants of personal injury compensation and found personality traits to lack any predictive value for feigned cognitive deficits.
Future research into the potential link between antisocial traits and symptom exaggeration may be worthwhile if, like the present study, it focusses on specific features of ASPD (and, by extension, psychopathy) rather than ASPD in general. However, the extant research weighs against personality characteristics being causal to symptom exaggeration such that it would arguably be more interesting to explore alternative avenues of research. One such avenue could be to explicitly examine the 'adaptational model' proposed by Rogers (1990b) , which posits that malingering is typically the result of a cost-benefit analysis prompted by situational variables (e.g., particular opportunities to obtain financial gain or escape responsibilities). Other angles that may be worth exploring are to conceptualize potential relationships between antisocial features and malingering in terms of social-cognitive processes that constitute malingering (e.g., Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014) or beliefs characteristics that typify ASPD (e.g., Beck et al., 2001) .
The take-home message of this study is that antisocial traits, including deceitfulness (which we assessed through offense report inaccuracy, denial of offense, offense minimization, and denial of aggression), lack of remorse, and blame externalization, are not meaningfully related to symptom exaggeration and therefore have no place in the assessment of symptom validity or the detection of malingering. In fact, employment of antisocial traits as indicators of symptom exaggeration should be eschewed, because the proportion of correct classifications will likely be heavily outweighed by the proportions of false-positive and false-negative results. In closing, we assert that the present study adds to the body of data that proves the DSM wrong to disregard decades of progress in symptom validity assessment (e.g., see Merten et al., 2013) and ignore substantiated calls for change in the malingering criteria, such as that of Rogers (1992) for the DSM-IV, and Berry and Nelson (2010) for the DSM-5.
